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Was	Farage	the	midwife	delivering	Johnson’s	victory?
The	Brexit	Party	and	the	size	of	the	Conservative
majority
In	the	2019	election,	the	Brexit	Party	stood	only	in	opposition	seats	and	asked	its	candidates	to
stand	down	in	Conservative-held	seats.	Pippa	Norris	estimates	that	the	impact	of	this	strategy
doubled	Johnson’s	parliamentary	majority.	So,	despite	his	party	being	wiped	out	in	this	election,
Farage’s	role	has	been	one	of	kingmaker	in	terms	of	both	the	predominance	of	the	Brexit	agenda
and	the	size	of	the	Conservative	majority.
On	election	night	and	its	aftermath,	all	the	headline	attention	focused	on	Boris	Johnson’s
triumphant	80-seat	parliamentary	majority,	the	Conservative	party’s	largest	since	1987.	This	result
is	all	the	more	remarkable	given	years	of	austerity	cuts	by	successive	Tory	governments,	doubts
about	Johnson’s	flamboyant	character,	and	fratricidal	internal	party	division	over	Britain’s	membership	of	the	EU.
The	outcome	has	been	attributed	to	the	focused	message	and	disciplined,	but	ultra-vague	repetition	of	the	‘Get
Brexit	done’	mantra,	and	the	aggressive	targeting	of	Northern	seats	with	pledges	to	splash	the	cash.
Equal	attention	in	the	post-mortem	focused	on	the	reasons	for	the	collapse	in	Labour	support,	especially	in	their
North	East	Leave-voting,	former	mill-and-mining	heartlands.	Labour	returned	with	just	201	seats,	their	fewest
number	of	MPs	since	1935,	and	their	fourth	successive	general	electoral	defeat.	Much	blame	has	been	cast	on	the
unpopularity	of	Jeremy	Corbyn’s	leadership,	the	party’s	studious	ambiguity	on	Brexit,	as	well	as	their	Momentum-
led	radical-socialist	economic	agenda,	and	the	party’s	unfocused	Christmas	tree	manifesto	pledges	on	welfare
spending.	Corbyn	campaigned	on	traditional	Labour	issue	like	the	NHS,	but	he	was	not	fighting	on	the	Brexit
battleground,	the	most	important	issue	to	the	electorate.
By	contrast,	after	Nigel	Farage’s	brief	BBC	interview	with	Andrew	Neil	on	election	night,	there	has	been	relatively
little	discussion	about	the	Brexit	Party.	After	all,	they	ended	with	a	paltry	2%	of	the	vote	and	no	MPs.	UKIP
performed	even	worse,	with	22,817	votes	(0.1%).	Both	parties	are	seemingly	consigned	to	become	a	footnote	of
modern	history	and	the	occasional	doctoral	thesis.	Robert	Ford,	for	example,		remarked	that	the	Brexit	party	proved
an	‘electoral	flop’,	with	the	main	effect	of	their	efforts	likely	to	have	saved	several	Labour	incumbents	by	‘splitting
the	Leave	vote’.
But	is	this	a	correct	assessment	of	Farage’s	legacy	–	in	particular,	what	was	the	broader	impact	of	the	Brexit	Party
on	the	agenda	and	results	of	this	general	election?	Arguably,	despite	being	wiped	out	electorally,	Farage’s	role	has
been	one	of	kingmaker.	As	Giovanni’s	Sartori	observed	decades	ago,	minor	parties	can	still	serve	a	critical	function
through	their	‘blackmail’	potential,	even	if	they	fail	to	win	seats	or	ministerial	office.	The	impact	of	Nigel	Farage	was
both	direct	–	on	votes	and	seats	–	and	indirect	–	on	the	policy	agenda.
Direct	effects	on	party	competition
What	matters	for	the	electoral	outcome	is	not	simply	demand-side	factors	–	long-term	shifts	in	partisan	dealignment
and	generational	shifts	in	cultural	values,	loosening	the	salience	of	the	traditional	Left-Right	economic	cleavage	and
the	politics	of	class,	as	argued	in	Cultural	Backlash	–	but	also	their	interaction	with	supply-side	factors.	These
include	strategic	decisions	by	leaders	over	Downsian	party	competition,	within	a	broader	context	of	the
opportunities	for	exerting	power	and	influence	within	the	Westminster	electoral	system.
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Thus,	one	of	the	key	reasons	for	the	outcome,	often	neglected	in	the	election	post-mortems,	concerns	the	impact	of
strategic	party	competition,	especially	whether	party	leaders	decide	to	informally	cooperate	with	rivals.	This	is
particularly	important	in	the	UK,	given	the	high	hurdles	needed	to	win	office	in	a	majoritarian/plurality	electoral
system.	The	Conservative	share	of	the	vote	under	Johnson,	after	all,	went	up	only	1.4%	across	the	country,	almost
unchanged	from	May’s	2017	result.	Despite	this,	the	Tories	gained	47	seats	and	the	Johnson	government	enjoys	a
comfortable	80-seat	parliamentary	majority,	freed	from	May’s	shackles	of	a	government	depending	upon	an
informal	agreement	with	the	DUP.	The	outcome	should	not	be	attributed	necessarily	to	the	supposed	brilliance	of
the	Conservative	campaign	and	their	leader,	the	weakness	of	their	opposition,	or	the	disparities	of	the	winner’s
bonus	in	the	UK’s	First-Past-the-Post	electoral	system,	as	other	argue,	but	rather,	at	least	in	part,	to	the	spoiler	role
of	the	Brexit	party	combined	with	divisions	over	strategy	and	tactics	among	opposition	parties	within	the	Remain
camp,	which	prevented	their	effective	cooperation.	The	result	reflected	the	old	adage:	united	they	stand,	divided
they	fall.	While	Farage	formed	a	Leave	phalanx	with	the	Tories,	the	Remain	troops	scattered	their	forces	across	the
battlefield.
Figure	1	illustrates	how	UKIP,	and	then	the	successor	Brexit	Party,	both	experienced	roller-coaster	rides	in
successive	local,	European,	and	general	elections.	UKIP	ran	378	candidates	in	the	June	2017	general	election	–
but	won	just	half	a	million	votes	(1.8%),	with	no	seats.	Despite	this	wipe-out,	the	major	parties,	especially	the
Conservatives,	were	rocked	by	the	initial	electoral	success	of	the	Brexit	Party,	which	won	the	largest	share	of	the
UK	national	vote	and	seats	in	the	May	2019	party-list	European	Parliamentary	elections,	just	four	months	after
founding.	Most	strikingly,	the	party	swept	up	almost	half	of	the	over-65s.	The	opinion	polls	registered	around	23%
support	for	the	Brexit	party	at	their	peak	a	few	weeks	later,	in	mid-June	2019,	when	they	were	tied	or	even	a	point
or	two	ahead	of	the	two	major	parties.
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Given	this	result,	when	the	2019	campaign	kicked	off,	the	Brexit	Party’s	challenge	to	politics	as	usual	appeared
formidable.	In	early	November	2019,	as	the	general	election	campaign	started,	the	Brexit	party	initially	announced
that	it	would	contest	all	632	British	seats	and	speculated	publicly	about	a	‘Leave	alliance’	with	the	Tories.	But	the
Conservatives	quickly	rejected	any	sort	of	electoral	pact,	treating	their	rival	upstarts	strategically	like	a	pariah.	In
response,	on	11	November	2019	Farage	climbed	down	and	declared	that	the	Brexit	party	would	withdraw	in	317
seats	won	by	Conservatives	in	2017,	to	avoid	splitting	the	Leave	vote.	This,	combined	with	subsequent	Brexit
candidate	defections,	triggered	a	collapse	in	their	popular	support.	Their	share	of	voting	support	subsided	in	the
opinion	polls	from	an	average	of	10%	at	the	start	of	the	campaign	to	just	3%	at	the	end,	as	supporters	drifted	back
to	the	Tories.	Farage	was	still	included	in	media	coverage	and	the	larger	TV	leadership	debates,	campaigning	for	a
‘clean-break’	Brexit	and	political	reform,	but	the	Brexit	party	saw	a	substantial	collapse	in	their	total	amount	of
media	coverage	during	the	final	weeks	of	the	campaign.	Election	night	saw	that	Brexit	had	won	just	2%	of	the	vote
(642,323),	with	no	seats,	while	the	rump	UKIP	part	got	a	miserable	22,817	votes	(0.1%).
Therefore,	Nigel	Farage	decided	to	play	the	long	game	by	competing	strategically	in	the	election	only	in	opposition
seats,	asking	Brexit	candidates	to	stand	down	in	Conservative-held	seats.	This	served	two	goals:	as	a	brand-new
party,	for	expedient	reasons,	Brexit’s	financial	and	organizational	resources	were	over-stretched.	Moreover,	the
stated	aim	of	this	strategy	was	to	present	a	united	front	which	avoided	splitting	the	Leave	vote.	This	strategy	had
two	consequences:	the	Brexit	Party	had	opportunities	to	snatch	Leave	ballots	in	Labour-held	seats,	without
simultaneously	damaging	the	electoral	prospects	for	incumbent	Conservative	MPs.	At	the	same	time,	the	Remain
vote	remained	divided	because	Corbyn	stubbornly	ruled	out	any	informal	pact	and	various	efforts	to	organize
tactical	voting.	As	Figure	2	illustrates,	the	Conservatives	were	flanked	by	the	Brexit	Party,	but	otherwise	enjoyed
‘clear	blue	water’	to	shovel	up	Leave	votes	on	the	socially-conservative	and	nationalist	right.	By	contrast,	the
socially-liberal	left	parties	were	all	clustered	closely	together,	able	to	exchange	votes	with	each	other	but	thereby
dividing	the	spoils	and	failing	to	gain	seats.
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Source:	Pippa	Norris.	Global	Party	Survey,	Nov	2019	pre-release.
Labour’s	strategy	continued	to	reflect	leadership	hubris	and	outmoded	majoritarian	Westminster	norms.	This	proved
fatal	in	the	context	of	fragmented	party	competition	which	penalized	their	chances	of	consolidating	Remain	support
and	gaining	seats.	In	total	in	Britain,	excluding	Northern	Ireland,	the	Remain/pro	Referendum	parties	got	16.2
million	votes	(52.3%),	1.5	million	more	than	the	14.6	million	votes	cast	for	the	Leave	parties	(47.4%).	The	balance
of	voting	support	was	remarkably	close	to	that	estimated	in	the	long	series	of	YouGov	polls	since	late	2017
concerning	right	track/wrong	track	levels	of	support	for	Leave	or	Remain	options	in	the	general	electorate.	The
outcome	of	the	general	election	therefore	reflects,	in	part,	the	disastrous	failure	of	opposition	party	strategy	and
leadership	to	come	together	in	an	informal	Remain	Alliance	electoral	pact	in	a	First-Past-the-Post	system,	not
simply	a	triumph	of	the	Johnson	campaign,	or	a	failure	of	the	appeal	of	Corbyn’s	personal	character,	problems	of
press	bias,	internal	rows	over	anti-semitism,	or	Labour’s	manifesto	policies.
The	impact	of	party	strategies
Does	the	scale	of	their	electoral	support	mean	that	we	should	write	off	the	Brexit	party	as	irrelevant	to	the	outcome
–	or	that	Farage	failed	in	his	grand	project?	On	the	contrary,	Farage’s	strategic	decision	to	compete	in	Labour
seats,	but	not	in	Conservative	seats,	was	arguably	decisive	for	the	eventual	outcome.
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Analysis	of	constituency	results	in	the	2017	and	2019	general	elections	shows	that	in	seats	where	Brexit	party
candidates	stood,	the	change	in	the	share	of	the	UKIP/Brexit	vote	was	more	strongly	correlated	with	the	fall	in	the
Labour	share	of	the	vote	than	in	the	Conservative	or	Liberal	Democrat	share.	This	relationship	continued	as
significant,	albeit	weaker,	even	after	models	controlled	for	the	social	composition	of	constituencies.	In	seats	with	a
Brexit	candidate,	the	Labour	vote	fell	on	average	by	-8.6%,	compared	with	-7.3%	elsewhere.	There	was	also	a
modest	impact	with	Brexit	taking	some	support	from	the	Tories:	in	seats	with	a	Brexit	candidate,	the	Conservative
vote	went	up	1.7%	compared	with	2.5%	elsewhere.	But	my	estimates	suggest	that	the	share	of	the	Brexit	vote	was
large	enough	to	allow	the	Conservatives	to	slip	in	the	back	door	and	make	up	to	20	seat	gains	in	former	Labour
areas,	thereby	doubling	Johnson’s	eventual	parliamentary	majority	(see	Figure	3).
Source:	Pippa	Norris.	2019.	UK	Parliamentary	Constituency	dataset,	2010-2019.
The	Conservative	party	would	have	won	a	smaller	parliamentary	majority	without	the	Brexit	party	alliance.	Farage’s
party	thereby	served	as	a	spoiler,	allowing	the	Conservatives	to	seize	many	Labour	seats	in	the	North	and	Midlands
which	had	never	changed	hands	for	generations.	This	bonanza	is	all	the	more	remarkable	given	a	rise	of	only	1.4%
in	the	Conservatives’	nation-wide	share	of	the	UK	vote	since	2017.	Meanwhile,	by	contrast,	Remain	voters	on	the
liberal	left	scattered	support	among	the	Liberal	Democrats,	the	Greens,	the	SNP	and	Plaid	Cymru,	as	well	as	the
more	ambivalent	Labour	party.
Indirect	effects	on	the	issue	agenda
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The	entrance	of	UKIP	and	then	the	Brexit	Party	also	shaped	British	politics	in	an	even	more	profound	way	indirectly,
by	mobilizing	authoritarian-populist	forces	and	thereby	polarizing	the	country	and	the	policy	agenda	around	Brexit.
Mainstream	parties	on	the	center-right	and	center-left	can	respond	to	new	rivals	by	strategic	attempts	at	either
exclusion	(treating	their	new	rivals	as	pariahs)	or	else	inclusion	(by	parroting	their	competitor’s	rhetoric	and	issues
positions).	Ever	since	Anthony	Downs,	the	consequences	of	these	strategies	have	been	widely	debated	in	terms	of
both	their	electoral	effects	and	their	impact	on	the	policy	agenda.	Farage	has	obviously	failed	at	gaining	office	at
Westminster	–	but	he	has	had	a	profound	effect	on	the	policy	agenda	by	forcing	other	UK	parties	adapt	their	policy
position	towards	Europe.
Cases	vary,	but	in	many	countries,	new	authoritarian-populist	parties	have	become	accepted	as	legitimate	and
democratic	partners	with	a	seat	at	the	table,	thereby	directly	influencing	the	issue	agenda	in	parliament	and	the
composition	of	coalition	governments.	Elsewhere,	however,	exclusion	from	entry	to	governing	coalitions	is	often
common.	In	Germany,	for	example,	the	Christian	Democratic	Union	party	refused	to	collude	with	the	far-right
Alternative	for	Germany	(AfD),	despite	their	becoming	the	third	largest	party	in	the	Bundestag	in	2017.	In	extreme
cases,	some	authoritarian-populist	parties	have	been	banned	by	law,	for	example	the	racist	Flemish	Vlaams	Blok,
or	otherwise	legally	restricted	from	funding	or	ballot	access.
Even	where	treated	as	‘pariahs’,	however,	minor	rivals	can	still	impact	the	policy	agenda	indirectly,	by	forcing	the
mainstream	parties	to	adjust	their	stances	in	response	to	new	concerns,	in	this	case	by	parroting	issues	of
nationalism	and	immigration.	Johnson’s	unprincipled	ambitions,	and	the	machinations	of	the	ERG,	made	the
Conservative	Party	ripe	for	a	hostile	take-over	by	populist	forces.	In	this	regard,	both	major	parties	have	absorbed
the	cancer	of	Euroscepticism,	mobilized	by	Farage	and	the	ERG	Conservatives,	and	injected	this	into	the
mainstream	of	the	body	politics.
In	conclusion,	the	role	of	the	Brexit	Party	should	therefore	go	down	in	the	history	books	as	one	which	proved	an
electoral	failure	at	Westminster,	losing	the	general	election	battle.	But	in	the	long-term,	Farage	played	a	decisive
indirect	role	by	boosting	the	size	of	the	Conservatives’	electoral	victory,	fueling	the	politics	of	Brexit,	and	thus
influencing	the	UK’s	withdrawal	from	EU	membership,	strengthening	the	polarization	of	UK	party	competition
around	cultural	cleavages	dividing	nationalists	and	cosmopolitans,	and	even	potentially	heightening	existential
threats	to	the	future	of	the	United	Kingdom	as	an	independent	nation-state.
_________________
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